practices. In Virginia we have looked intensively at the records for an area south of the James River and just west of Richmond. Originally part of Henrico County, the area later fell into Goochland, Cumberland, and Chesterfield counties. This locale seems especially appropriate because studies have suggested that the social institutions of Southside Virginia were less advanced than elsewhere in the colony. Thus if certain legal forms were followed here, it seems likely that they extended throughout Virginia. The same area provides a sample of wills that can be used to ascertain testamentary patterns. Because of the numerous ethnic enclaves in New York, we have surveyed records from all portions of the colony, including the Dutch areas of the Hudson Valley, the Puritan settlements on Long Island, and the heterogeneous society of New York City.
Our investigation explores both common and statutory law in relation to the following questions: Could a married woman dispose of her property, make contracts, or sue for debts? If widowed, was she named administratrix or executrix of her husband's estate, and did she become the guardian of her children? Was the dower right enforced, and did husbands provide their wives with at least the minimum amount of real and personal property required by law? Did the colonists make any efforts to improve the legal status of wives? For example, did land conveyances change to benefit the feme covert? Last, with regard to family law, what economic options were open to the married woman? Our findings reveal that in every respect the New York and Virginia feme covert was very much involved in the legal system. Consequently, the traditional Blackstonian concept of marital unity does not apply.
Property Rights and the Married Woman
Women came in contact with the civil law in two general ways: in matters of property and contracts and of family law. In both regards, the common law definition of feme covert was the major disabling factor for women. A feme sole, the legal term for a widow or spinster, could convey property, make a valid contract, sue or be sued, execute a deed, and make a will. Technically, a feme covert could do none of these things without her husband's consent or participation.
In practice, in the early eighteenth century both New York and Virginia were willing to modify the common law restrictions when necessity or reason required. Three examples involving the rights of married women to dispose of property or to designate a guardian illustrate this flexibility. In I709 the Henrico County Court in Virginia debated whether to admit an oral will made by Jane Durand. The court was unsure whether her husband (apparently a mariner) was dead, hence whether her will was valid. Lacking determinate information, the justices ordered the will recorded and an estate inventory taken; they also honored the woman's choice of a guardian for her child. beyond English practice and recognized the wills of married women. For instance, under common law rulings a wife could not reserve the right to grant legacies from an estate placed in trust for her before marriage, even if her husband had consented. The Westchester County Court, however, honored and proved the I759 will of Elizabeth Sands which began "By and with the advise and consent of my husband Samuel Sands, and my trustee Elisha Barton, I do make this my last Will and Testament."6 Likewise contrary to law, Martha Smith of Long Island, though married, ran a very lucrative whaling business in the first decade of the century without resorting to equity law to declare herself a feme sole trader.7
Feme covert status, as interpreted by the courts of these colonies, permitted the filing of suits by married women if they acted jointly with their husbands. Court records from Goochland, Cumberland, and Henrico counties indicate that the joint suit was the normal procedure in Virginia. The Minutes of the Mayor's Court for the City of New York, I707-I735, confirm a similar practice in that colony.8 A joint suit covered all debts owed to a wife, whether contracted before or during the marriage. In all likelihood aspiring young New York law students learned this from a book of precedents which included the case of David and MargaretJones. The Joneses were filing a joint suit to collect a debt of so incurred before Margaret married. Stephen Stockcum, the defendant, had refused to pay because he erroneously believed that, because a married woman could not make a valid contract, the debt he owed Margaret while she was single was no longer in force. The New York Supreme Court upheld the debt. Thus the would-be lawyers learned both that marriage did not invalidate contracts and that married women should file joint suits.9
The joint suit also served in Virginia and New York as the normal procedure to settle debts owed to an estate administered by a widow who remarried. In New York in I736, for example, Gabriel Stelle and Margaret Stelle, widow of Isaac Carrie, filed together to collect a debt 6 Sometimes a remarried woman retained some independence of action as administratrix, executrix, or guardian." In both New York and Virginia remarried women occasionally appear in court records as if they were still feme sole. Elizabeth Lavillain of Cumberland County, Virginia, remarried twice while administering the estate of her first husband, Anthony Lavillain. When she filed the final report, the accounting for each year appeared under her name alone. Her rapid changes of marital status had worried the men who had posted bond for her administration, and they had petitioned the court to require her last husband, Joseph Starkey, to post bond for the estate. Starkey refused, and Elizabeth Lavillain Starkey presented the accounts alone. Clearly she had sole responsibility.12
The Dutch heritage of New York allowed another exception to English testamentary practices. Roman-Dutch law permitted husbands and wives to execute joint wills. By this system the wife automatically took immediate possession of one-half of the joint estate when her husband died. She also had the right to decide how the remainder would be divided unless the deceased husband specified otherwise. Often the joint will granted the remaining spouse the entire estate, the only restriction being a provision that half would go to the children if the widow remarried. In a sample of ninety-eight Dutch wills filed before I700, half were joint. Unfortunately for New York married women, the custom rapidly declined in the eighteenth century, even though courts continued until the Revolution to honor any Dutch joint wills. New York also followed English common law inheritance rules that protected a widow's property rights. If the husband died intestate, New York awarded the widow one-third of his personal property or one-half if there were no children. She also received her dower right to a life interest in one-third of the realty in which the husband had been seised during coverture. In other words, the widow enjoyed the use and profit of onethird of their land during her lifetime. On her death the property would then descend to the husband's heir-at-law. A statute of i683 granted the dower within forty days, during which time a widow could remain in her late husband's house. This law, however, was disallowed by the crown, and custom permitted the widow to remain as long as she desired. Necessity dictated that at times a woman enjoy the use of the entire estate during her widowhood, particularly when minor children were involved.18
The inheritance practices of New Netherlands helped to create a milieu that encouraged property holding and business activity among New York married women. Unlike the English law that provided a dower right as a widow's old age pension, the Dutch practice called for an equal division of marital assets. On the death of either spouse both realty and personalty were divided into equal shares. One-half belonged to the survivor, and the other could be disposed of by the decedent by will, or in the absence of a will would 'pass to the intestate heirs. received one-third of the personalty after debts were settled and a onethird life interest in the realty. If a man wrote a will, he could reduce his wife's share of the personal estate, but she could not receive less than the share given to a child. If there were only one or two children, the woman was entitled to at least one-third.
The difference between the dower one-third life interest in real estate and the unencumbered but variable share in personal property led to a unique feature of Virginia's inheritance law. In I705 the legislature declared that slaves were real estate. The intent was to encourage landowners to consider slaves and the land they worked as a package, and provide for entail. Thus a widow would get the same share in slaves as she did in land. The numerous exceptions written into this law made clear that the assembly wanted slaves treated as chattels in every way except inheritance. The law did not work well, and the burgesses modified it in I727 to make more explicit the wife's dower right to slaves (while vesting ownership in the husband during his life) and to prevent this movable property from leaving the colony before it passed into the hands of residual heirs. In I748 the colony attempted to simplify inheritance by making slaves personal property. The inheritance statute enacted the same year, however, continued the widow's life interest in one-third of her husband's slaves rather than letting slaves pass to her as part of the personal estate. The crown disallowed these laws, leaving the situation as it stood in I 727. Thus Virginia widows had important rights to a one-third life interest in the family's slaves despite their lack of control of this property while their husbands lived.20
The law also protected widows whose husbands slighted them in wills. In both New York and Virginia, if the husband left a widow less than the share specified in law, she could renounce the bequest and sue for her dower right, the one-third life interest.21 Women did exercise the right to claim the widow's portion when dissatisfied with their husbands' bequests. William Maxey of Virginia ordered that his plantations be rented out during his widow's lifetime and that she receive a feather bed, a horse with sidesaddle and bridle, a Negro girl named Doll, and Li 5 yearly for life. Mary Maxey preferred, however, to have a place to live and control of their four-hundred-acre farm. Accordingly, in I768 she renounced the legacies and claimed her share under law.22 She was not the only woman to take this step after mid-century, but the action remained rare. After I 750 an increase in the number of wills giving wives no interest in land indicates that women had something to gain by filing such suits, but the rarity of the suits reflects the fact that most husbands exceeded the legally required bequest. Under the rule of freedom of testamentary disposition, husbands could bequeath their wives whatever they pleased as long as they met the minimum dower requirements. Our sample of I 3i eighteenth-century Virginia wills reveals that men usually gave their wives more than the statute governing inheritance required.23 As the century progressed, however, the legacies changed from unencumbered ownership to life interests. There was also a trend toward granting more of the personal property and slaves to the wife while saving the land for the children. Increasingly, sons received the land and daughters got slaves or cash, reflecting a change from a more sexually neutral pattern.24
Only 6 percent of husbands in the Virginia sample limited their wives' inheritances to the period of widowhood, although such limitations increased later in the century. The phrase "what the Law directs," which appears in the will of Cumberland County resident Edward Bryer, also appears in a few other wills, underlining awareness of the legal requirements.25 The shift from unencumbered interest to life interest, and the more frequent use of limitation of property to widowhood, had great consequences for the freedom of widows to manage their affairs. It is 23 The sample is not totally random. The wills, mainly from an area south of the James and upriver from Richmond, cover the years I700-I7 80. They are part of a family reconstitution project that focuses on the French Huguenot parish of King William and uses a sample of English wills from the same locality as a control. By I750 intermarriage was such that many English families were part of the King William network. 24 Unencumbered ownership meant that there were no restrictions on transfer or sale. A life interest gave a person possession of the land for his or her lifetime, after which the land passed to another person already specified. Thus the person with a life interest did not have the sole right to sell the property. Before I750, 26% of the wills left the wife a life interest, I4% made her sole heir, and 24% gave her an unencumbered share. The other 36% included wills of widows and widowers as well as those who received no land but were named executrixes of the estate. None were cut out entirely. After I 750, 4I% received a life interest and only 3% an unencumbered share; 2% were sole heirs. The rest, 54%, included 8% executrixes only, while the rest were the wills of widows or widowers. "Dower" is the life estate to which every married woman was entitled on the death of her husband intestate, or, in case she dissented from his will, one-third in value of all lands of which the husband had beneficially seized in law or in fact, at any time during coverture. It applies to real estate exclusively. The data from Lois Green Carr and Lorena S. Walsh's study of Maryland bequests suggest a similar shift in that colony ("The Planter' possible that husbands came to put less trust in their wives' managerial abilities, indicating a changing attitude toward women. It is also possible that the men feared the effects of remarriage on the estate that would eventually pass to their children. Thus it seems that husbands increasingly worried that women would not be able to protect the estate after remarriage. There was no increase in the remarriage rate of widows to heighten this fear, nor do we find a correlation with any decrease in the availability of land.
New York men followed a more restrictive pattern than Virginians in bequeathing land to their spouses and were more likely to circumscribe their widows in other ways as well. Similarly, although New Yorkers were more likely than Virginians to place such restrictions on widows as the loss of a portion of their legacies should they remarry, two-thirds of the husbands prescribed no such limits. In one common pattern the wife received the use of all real and personal property until the eldest son or all of the children came of age. At that point the widow normally retained only the use of the house or part of the house. There was a definite tendency after I750 to bequeath a smaller portion to the widow and limit the household space she would occupy once the children came of age. New York widows relied on their roles as administratrixes of estates and as guardians of minor children to maintain their lifestyles. In these cases the estate often remained intact for many years. (As a result, when children came of age and the estate was divided, widows often found themselves in reduced circumstances in personalty and land.) The majority of wills followed the law and granted the widow her share of the personal estate. A significant minority of the women, 44 percent, received more than an equal share of the personal estate. Thus, although widows in New York were not as well provided for as those in Virginia, they still fared better than the minimum statutory requirement for both real and personal property. Fortunately for married women, English law concerning land transfers proved cumbersome. Americans found the English attachment to an ancestral estate outmoded in a land-rich, labor-poor country. New Yorkers and Virginians speculated in land, traded estates to consolidate holdings, and sold worn-out acres in order to purchase fresh ones elsewhere. Under such circumstances a couple had to be able to dispose of any land brought to the marriage by the woman or acquired after marriage. In England conveyance of such land followed a circuitous procedure called a "fine and common recovery," in which a deed by the husband was accompanied by the wife's formal relinquishment of dower rights. Because a married woman had no independent legal existence, English law required a legal fiction to enable her to appear at court for a separate examination concerning her willingness to a sale. The process prevented a husband from selling the wife's inchoate property without her knowledge and consent, but it emphasized the subordinate status of a feme covert. About I700 the colonies began to simplify the form of deeds, proceeding The joint deed developed differently in the two colonies. While New York never enacted a joint-deed statute, Virginia made this method the statutory means of conveying land in which a married woman held an interest.30 A joint deed named the husband and wife together as the sellers, and both signed the document. Following the English fine-andrecovery tradition, the wife was then examined to assure the court that she had not been coerced. Other colonies followed suit. In I764 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, for example, upheld the tradition in that colony of using the joint deed followed by a private examination. Maryland, too, made similar provisions in its laws during the eighteenth century.31
In Virginia the practice could vary despite the statute. Other forms of deeds are found in the records, but the joint deed was the most common. Occasionally, the wife's name does not appear in the document but is among the signatures. In other cases, the wife neither signed nor appeared as a party in the deed, but invariably the court registered her private interview. County courts were repeatedly instructed to enter these interviews. Since the women did not always appear in court on the day the conveyance was registered, the records of the interviews are scattered throughout Virginia deed books, either separated from the deeds or squeezed into the margins of the entry. In a few cases the private interview did not occur in court, and a signed, witnessed affidavit was registered instead.32 New York land conveyances were even more diversified. A statute of i69 I and its amended form in I 77 I provided only that no estate of a feme covert could be legally sold unless she previously (and privately) acknowledged the sale before a member of the council or a judge of the supreme, chancery, or common pleas courts. The examiner was to sign an endorsement to the deed certifying the separate examination. However, counties 29 Thus in both New York and Virginia, custom and statute modified the common law concerning women's property rights. In general, the colonies took the common law concepts, such as dower, and extended them in ways that gave women more control over property than their English counterparts enjoyed. Similarly, practice indicates that women did not disappear as legal entities when they married but rather joined with their husbands to pursue legal obligations incurred before marriage. A remarried woman retained administration rights but usually joined with her new husband in suits to recover debts. In practice, generous inheritances from husbands often left widows in control of a considerable share of property, while the honoring of a widow's rights to paraphernalia allowed her to regain control over personal effects. Life tenureship certainly limited these rights, but the widow was not stripped of her clothing and jewelry, nor could life tenureship prevent the sale of lands. Neither British common law nor colonial practice deprived the married woman of all property rights.
Rights within the Family
The legal relationship of wife and husband followed a pattern similar to that described for property rights. English practice was not totally restrictive, and colonial practice at times allowed even greater freedom. To assess the legal status of married women in the family we will focus on guardianship customs, economic rights, and powers of attorney.
While seeking to recognize the feme covert's property rights, neither New York nor Virginia tampered with traditional laws of guardianship. The common law gave the husband sole control of his children during his lifetime, and unless he specifically named someone else in his will, the courts gave preference to the mother as guardian on his death.39 Virginia law authorized the father to bind out children to trades and to name guardians without the mother's consent. A New York father also had the I767 to I77 5 the court averaged twelve such cases a year. In 8o percent of these cases the court placed the children with the mother or stepfather, except in I767-I7 68, when in eleven instances the court chose a guardian other than the mother or stepfather. If the mother sought guardianship, she received it. Only once did the court deny a mother's petition for guardianship, unfortunately without recording an explanation.44
Virginia courts took a more active interest in guardianship. The counties were empowered to hold special orphans' courts at which guardians were summoned to give an accounting of the administration of minors' estates. These orphans' court sessions gave the justices leverage to intervene. They did, but not to harass mothers.45 Only once in our sample was a mother who had not remarried called to give an accounting. The Virginia justices, unlike those of New York, mistrusted stepfathers as guardians, and in the counties studied they seldom named a stepfather as guardian. Changes in guardianship in the southern colony were more a result of natural coming-of-age processes for orphans than of interference by the court because remarried mothers were considered unable to protect their children's estates from stepfathers. Thus children changed guardians when an older brother or sister turned twenty-one and could assume guardianship, when they wished to assert independence from their mothers, or when minor women married. In all of these instances the young adult made use of common law provisions that allowed orphans fourteen years or older to choose their own guardians.46
Feme covert status did not prevent a married woman from participating in economic activities for her family or herself. The family, after all, was the basic economic unit of pre-industrial America, and the wife had separate economic duties within that unit. A few historians have questioned the extent of women's participation in economic affairs,47 but evidence suggests that married women in New York and Virginia were active in at least three ways: as representatives for absent husbands, as managers of family businesses when husbands were present, and as operators of their own businesses.
The power of attorney gave wives a means to represent absent husbands or serve the couple's business and legal needs. The power of attorney was a common tool in the seventeenth century, but English pressure forced owing chiefly to the increasing number of professional attorneys. The effect was to limit the court appearances of wives, especially upperand middle-class women who could afford a lawyer, thus reinforcing ideas of a separate sphere for women that were developing among the "better sort."51 Whatever their standing in law, women were able to participate extensively in economic matters through informal agreements with their spouses. Thus wives acted as attorneys-in-fact for their husbands whether or not a power of attorney had been granted. Many women in New York and Virginia were helpmates to their husbands in business or on the farm. Though common law disabilities prevented a married woman from acting on her own to make contracts, sue, recover a debt, or sell property, English equity law provided a loophole by which a feme covert could be declared a feme sole trader. What is interesting is how often both the disabilities and the equity loophole were simply ignored by wives who acted on their own. Mrs. Smith, for example, had never been declared a feme sole trader, and yet Robert Carter transacted business with her and considered the wheat hers. Even the few instances where women petitioned for relief from the common law disabilities reflected the preference for granting married women informal rights rather than formal feme sole status. Susannah Cooper and Frances Greenhill both petitioned the Virginia assembly in the I740s for private acts granting them the right to dispose of property because they had been deserted by their husbands many years before. Each woman had managed her family's affairs for over twenty years without formal feme sole status. The private act making Greenhill a feme sole in I744 the newspapers make clear that many women were in business without special acts of Council or grants of freemanship.55 Significantly, New York included women in the laws governing importation of liquor, sloop owners, and Indian traders, and used both "he" and "she" in all legislation concerning occupations. Also, although a husband jointly signed any apprenticeship indentures his wife might agree to, the indentures became void if she died before their expiration.56
Probably the most notable example of a married entrepreneur is Mary Alexander (died I7 6o), who bore ten children during two marriages while prospering in New York City as an importer of dry goods. So great was her dedication to her business that the day after giving birth to a daughter, according to her husband, she returned to her store and sold over ?30 worth of merchandise. Thus neither law nor custom appears to have prevented a feme covert from making contracts or pursuing a merchant's occupation in her own name. Less well known is Elizabeth Journdaine, who in I70i began importing a variety of merchandise while married to a shipowner and operator. She remained in business after her husband died and continued to import dry goods and rum until I 729. 57 Although it is difficult to explain the extension of women's legal rights to business management, the men displayed for businesswomen helped assure that women would not be barred from any of the governed trades and occupations. The economic activities of married women in Virginia are less well documented, yet their activities could be essential to the prosperity of their families. Plantation mistresses sold fruits, vegetables, and poultry in local markets and did sewing, spinning, and weaving for neighbors. They received payment for these activities, but, like Thomas Smith's wife, did not request that the courts grant them feme sole trader status. The orphans' court records of Cumberland County reveal that at least two married women in that area had medical/midwifery practices. In the small towns and cities of Virginia some women ran businesses separate from those of their husbands. For example, the wife of Williamsburg printer Alexander Purdie was a milliner. Julia Spruill documented payments to Virginia wives who were in business for themselves in a number of occupations, including those of teacher, milliner, shopkeeper, and tavernkeeper. These women did not bother to have themselves declared feme sole traders.59
Conclusion
What did the legal codes and practices in New York and Virginia mean for the average wife? The evidence indicates that women were active participants in nearly every phase of the system. Colonial laws recognized the English principle that married women had property rights by protecting the dower and went further by encouraging the joint deed. In practice, as in England, the private examination forced men to be cognizant of their wives' interests in property and abide by their wishes, but colonial laws did not introduce the concept of legal fiction for married women despite its strong position in England. Occasionally, lawyers trained in English law used fine and recovery, but these deeds were exceptions in practice. In a number of areas, as we have noted, significant changes occurred during the eighteenth century. In general, before I750, if the custom of these colonies differed from that of England, it was in the direction of simplicity and in favor of women.
By mid-century, however, married women in both New York and Virginia faced new obstacles. New York City women could no longer become freemen; the power of attorney was no longer a frequent tool for wives; husbands began to give their wives less control over property; widows found themselves forced to sue to gain the minimum bequests set by law; and women increasingly received smaller portions or life interests when their husbands died. These changes resulted from the efforts of lawyers to make colonial practices conform to those of England, from a growing inclination among American gentry to accept the the gentlewoman as an ornament, and from a variety of economic and demographic factors.
More restrictive interpretations of the common law by nineteenthcentury jurists, feminists, and historians have obscured the actual workings of the eighteenth-century colonial legal system. The common law provided colonial wives with protections for their dower and paraphernalia as well as guardianship rights. Equity procedures could further mitigate the limitations of coverture. The records of Virginia and New York make clear that as need arose, these colonies staked out a larger sanctioned territory for wives and widows than historians have thought. The feme covert applied English precepts to good advantage and garnered further benefits from a pragmatic interpretation and application of the law by legislatures and courts.
